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FAITH AND REASON IN AQUINAS AND LLULL 
What often goes by the name of «the problem of faith and reason» —and by 
extension the derivative problems of theology and philosophy and of science 
and religion— will always be of interest to thinkers who are philosophically 
inclined and possessed of authentic religious convictions, especially if they 
adhere to one of the great monotheist religions. Almost certainly it cannot be 
otherwise if by «faith» we understand —in correct Christian terminology,— 
one of the theological virtues, 1 as well as both its distinctive object and charac-
ter of activity; and if by «reason» : we have in mind man's natural cognitive 
powers and the knowledge obtained by means of them without any sort of 
supernatural assistance. Such has been the understanding of those terms by 
those thinkers whom historians and other students of philosophy are wont to 
identify as «Chris t ian phi losophers» , part icularly if they lived during the 
Middle Ages and were associated with our earliest universities. Speaking of 
those Medieval philosophers an author recently wrote that a constant theme of 
theirs was the mentioned problem of faith and reason/ On the ensuing pages 
my intention is to compare briefly ihe somewhat contrasting attitudes on and 
answers to that problem as understood by two great acknowledged medieval 
thinkers. namely Thomas Aquinas and Ramon LIull. 
At the outset we ought to point out that, notwithstanding differences on 
important details, there is no outright opposition between those two thinkers on 
the main questions that constitute the problem of faith and reason. It should bc 
noted at least that the slightly later —and today slightly less known— Ramon 
Llull was neither attacking nor opposing the positions taken by Aquinas on the 
main questions a few years before Llull embarked on his own literary career, as 
St. Thonias. Summa theologiae, I-IIae, q. 62, aa. 1/2, in Opera Latina, Leonine ed. (Rome. IX1)I), 
Vol. 6. pp. 401/2. For an authorilative concise statement of the Christian understanding of failh see 
Catechism of tlte Catholic Church (Vatiean: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1994), p. 446. 
: St. Thomas, op. cit., I, q. 79. a. 8 (1889). Vol. 5, p. 274. 
' Llinares, Armand, Rayntoncl Lttlle, philosophe cle Vaction (Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de 
France. 1963). p. 257. 
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seemingly intimated by the author just cited in a book wherein he explains 
LlulTs philosophy rather well otherwise. 4 To come across differences in the 
solutions of the two thinkers to the problem of faith and reason, even on signifi-
cant details, ought not to surprise us greatly, provided we keep in mind their 
diverse approaches to it, the result in part undoubtedly of their different back-
grounds and of their immediate objectives as regard those whom they wished to 
reach via their writings. By reason of his vocation and worthy profession as a 
school or university teacher during most of his adult life, Aquinas was mainly 
engaged in the instruction of younger religious confreres and of possibly other 
young Christians linked in some fashion to the mendicant order known as the 
Order of Preachers. As a consequence most of his many writings were primarily 
addressed to readers who shared his own Catholic Faith, at least in its essentials. 
Quite differently on the other hand, Llull lived most of his formative years, and 
not a few later ones, in areas of his native Spain until recently occupied and 
inhabited by the followers of Islam, as well as by a not insignificant number of 
Jewish believers. One of three challenging and lofty objectives to which Llull 
chose to dedicate his relatively long life required of him that he work constantly 
and courageously for the conversion of leading believers in those two groups, 
who, well regarded because of learning or of their high social position, might 
then influence their correligionists to become Chr i s t i ans / LlulFs numerous 
books and a dramatic autobiographical account, 6 dictated by him to friends five 
years before his death, provide abundant proof of both the earnestness and the 
constancy of his endeavors in that direction. 
The problem of faith and reason —with the questions linked to it— is occa-
sioned by the acknowledgement by Christians —as well as by other believers at 
least implicitly— of two very distinct orders or kinds of truths. 7 Those two 
orders are not simply distinct, but at times may even appear to clash with one 
another in some sort of opposition," if not by their very content, certainly because 
of their different sources and in the manner in which the truths have become 
known to us. For instance, in matters that refer primarily to God Aquinas expli-
citly asserts that there are two distinct kinds of truths which have become 
known to man in two very different ways.1' We have, he tells us first, a number 
' Ibid., p. 258 
5 See «Historical Background and Life of Ramon Llull», in Selected Works of Ramon Llull, tr. 
Anlhony Bonner (Princeton, 1985), Vol. L p p . 15-16. 
6 Under the title Vita coetanea the original Latin Text may be read in ROL VIII, pp. 272-304. 
' St. Thomas. Sttmma conlra genliles sive de veritate calltolicae ftdei, bk. 1, c. 3, in Opera Ixtlina, 
Leonine ed. (Rome: 1918), Vol. 18. p. 7. 
" Ibid., c. 7, Vol. 18, p. 19. 
' «Sunt igilur quaedam intelligibilium divinorum. quae rationi humanae sunt pervia; quaedam vero, 
quae omnino vim humanae rationis excedunt.» Ibid., c. 3, Vol. 18, p. 8. 
FAITH AND REASON IN AQUINAS AND LLULL 53 
of truths which totally escape the power of the human intellect or reason to dis-
cover and to establish rationally beyond any questions and doubt. The Catholic 
doctrines of the Trinity and of the Incarnation are two instances of such truths 
that a Christian may readily give or cite. They are truths which can be known by 
us only because God has chosen to reveal them to us. With some other truths 
which as a matter of God chose to reveal by reason of their intimate connection 
with man 's ul t imate destiny, they const i tute the essential teachings of the 
Christian Religion and Faith. Of the truths that absolutely required to be divi-
nely revealed in order for man to learn about them Aquinas would have us 
speak as «articles of faith.»'" Other actually revealed truths which did not alto-
gether need to have been revealed —because they are in principle discoverable 
or demonstrable in principle by human reason— Aquinas would rather identify 
as «preambles» or praesupposita of the faith," though he did indeed accept the 
fact that God has actually revealed them. There is then accordingly, according to 
Aquinas also and as he proceeds to explain more explicitly, another type of 
truths, a second order of truths, about which man can learn, and which may at 
times speak mainly about God, although in most cases they have to do with our-
selves and the world around us. These other truths, however, are at least in prin-
ciple discoverable by us, working exclusively with our natural cognitive powers 
in their natural condition or way. Of such natural powers the one we name 
«intellect» or «reason» is what chiefly enables us to discover and accept them. 
Unlike the first type of truths which require divine intervention if man is to 
know about them initially, the second order of truths extends to all naturally 
knowable truths. But as already noted, God actually chose to reveal some of 
these naturally discoverable truths on account of their importance and necessity 
for humans to achieve their ultimate end or destiny. 1 2 These are the truths which 
Aquinas, we said already, would have us call or speak of as «preambles of the 
faith.» 
Ramon Llull, as his numerous writings clearly show, was a careful and well 
instructed Christian thinker. Indications abound that, although he did not always 
use the same words Aquinas used, Llull also distinguished the two mentioned 
orders of truths. We find proof of it in both his early and his later writings. In an 
encyclopedic Liber contemplationis in Deum," with which he practically initia-
'" St. Thomas, Summa theol. Il-IIae, q. 1, a. 6 (1895), Vol. 8, p. 18. 
11 St. Thomas, Quaestio disputala de veritale. q. 14, a. 9, ad 8, in Quaestiones disputalae de veritate 
in Opera Omnia, Leonine ed. (Rome, 1972), Vol. 22, p. 464. Also Summa theol.. I, q. 2, a. 2. ad 1, Vol. 
5, p. 30. 
, ! St. Thomas, Summa theol., II-IIae, q. 2, a. 4, Vol. 8. p. 30. 
" The Latin text of this early Lullian masterpiece may be consulted in volumes 9 and 10 (last two 
published volumes) of MOG. The original Catalan text may be read in ORL II-VIII. 
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ted his literary career, Llull inserted a separate distinction with six chapters 
given exclusively to reflections on «the tree of faith and reason.» 1 4 He did so 
with more than an implicit acceptance of the two mentioned orders of truths. 
Thus he acknowledged first that, on the basis of data initially received by way 
of admittedly limited senses, man is capable, through proper use of his intellect, 
of gathering reliable and truthful information about significant segments of the 
realm of reality, and in such a way that he can be confidently certain of it. For 
all that however, when it comes to some truths and information about God par-
ticularly man has no choice but to have recourse to the teachings of faith. 1 3 
There are therefore truths, according to Llull, even about God, which man is 
able to apprehend naturaliter through the work of his intellect." , But likewise 
there are other truths, about God particularly though not exclusively, which we 
cannot with our intellect alone initially learn about or fully understand on the 
basis of intellectually necessitating reasons. According to LIull. these truths 
which man can initially learn about and accept only because God has chosen to 
reveal them, as well as all other truths which God may have chosen to reveal 
because of their importance for salvation, actually are the articles of faith 1 7 
which he, an earnest Christian, desired non-Christian believers to share also and 
to accept, particularly those who were followers of Islam amongst whom he had 
lived long and whom he knew rather well. It was on their account that he endea-
vored with and in faith to find compelling reasons which might encourage them 
to at least begin to inquire into the truth of the Christian Faith. I H 
An important item to consider at the start of an investigation of the problem 
of faith and reason has to do obviously with the correct understanding of faith 
and reason, particularly as it can be uncovered in the writings of the two think-
ers who interest us at present. In his accounts or explanations of faith, both in 
his widely known Summa theologica^ and in his Quaestiones disputatae de 
" Namely distinction 36. chapters 238-244. MOG IX, pp. 41-64. 
15 «Fides esl ipsa virtus, quae intellectum cogit ad crcdcndum vera de Deo, quae homo non intelligit 
per necessarias rationes.» Declaratio Raimundi per modum dialogi edita contra aliquorum philosopho-
rum et eorum sequacium opiniones erroneas damanatas a venerahili patre domino episcopo parisiensi, 
c. 16. ROL XVII, p. 282. 
1 6 «Intellectus est potentia, cum qua homo naturaliter intelligit intelligibilia entia...» Disputatio Fidei 
et Intellectus, prol., MOG IV, viii, I (479). 
" «...fidem a Deo datam, ut Catholicus per fidem crcdat articulos et Sacram Scripturam, quae non 
inlelligil per argumentum», Disputatio eremitae et Rayimtndi. bk. I, q. 1, in MOG IV, iv. 2 (226). Llull 
wrote at least two books in whose titles appears «articles of faith.» They are: Liher de quatuordecim arti-
culis sacrosanctae Romanae Calholicae Fidei in MOG II, v,1-190 (421-610), and Liber de articttlis ftdci 
Sacrosanctae ac Sulutiferae Legis Christianae sive Liber apostrophe in MOG IV, ix, 1 -26 (505-30). 
" Examples of these nolable efforts: The Book of the Genlile and the Three Wise Men in Selected 
Works of Rumon Llull. tr. Anthony Bonner (Princeton. 1985, Vol. 1. pp. 110-304; Disputatio Rayinundi ci 
Hamar saraceni in MOG IV, vii, 1 -46 (431-77); Liher de quinque sapientibus in MOG II, iii, 1 -51 (125-75). 
" II-Ilae, q. 2. a. I. vol. 8. p. 26-7. 
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veritate,20 St. Thomas distinguishes faith from other states or frames of mind 
wherein, at least to some extent, we may find ourselves in possession of some 
truth, and the latter epistemologically understood as a conformity or agreement 
between knowledge and reality. Correctly presupposing the objectivity of man's 
two-fold way of cognitionally seizing reality,2 1 of our sentory and of our inte-
llectual knowledge : : that is, Aquinas recalls to our attention in those wrilings 
these particular states of mind wherein in some way we have to do with the 
truth: faith, opinion, doubt, and solid or well established rational human know-
ledge. The last one in turn he distinguishes into direct or immediate understan-
ding first, and secondly into mediate rational knowledge of which he speaks as 
science or demonstrative knowledge. : ! With the first of these two instances of 
well established human knowledge he associates our «intellect», and with the 
second instance our «reason»,2"1 though elsewhere he makes it clear that both of 
these words name the same intellectual or rational cognitive faculty in man. It is 
differentiated however, on the basis of whether through it we seize truth directly 
or whether we do so as a result of other previously known premises or truths. 
Unlike in the case of opinion and doubt, both faith and rationally established 
knowledge entail a firm intellectual acceptance of something proposed as true, 
though with a difference on what motivates that acceptance. In the case of ratio-
nal knowledge it is simply the evidence, immediate or mediate, that determines 
and in a sense compels our intellect or reason to give its assent to the truth pre-
sented to it. Differently in faith the assent by the intellect comes about as a 
result in part of a prior movement or influence on the part of the power of the 
will, 2 5 the latter itself assisted by God's grace when there is question of divine 
faith, one of the theological virtues in other words. 
Opinion and doubt namc states of mind that similarly have some bearing on 
our knowledge of the truth. They differ, however, from both faith and well esta-
blished rational knowledge in that in neither one of them does our intellect or 
reason accept a proposed truth firmly or with certitude. Correctly understood, 
opinion names a state of mind wherein, although we do not accept either a given 
proposition or its opposite as true firmly, with our intellect we do incline to one 
or the other as probably true on the basis of reasonable evidence offered for it. 
We do so, however, with the recognition and with a reasonable fear that the 
opposite or contradictory of what we may incline to may actually turn out to be 
" Q. 14, a. 1. Vol. 22. pp. 436-7. 
2 1 St. Thomas, Summa theol., I, q. 78, aa 3-4; q. 79. aa. 1-2. vol. 5, pp. 253-57, 258-60. 
- St. Thomas, De verilute. q. 14. a. I, vol. 22, pp. 435-38. 
;" Loc. cit. 
" Loc. cil. 
a «Prooedit autem hujusmodi acius a voluntate et ab intellectu.» II-IIae. q. 4. a. 2. Vol. 8. p. 45. 
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the truth. 2" Contrariwise in cases of outright doubt there is not even the inclina-
tion to one side or the other of a given contradiction, and that either because of 
no evidence at all on either side or because the available evidence is of equai 
weight on both sides, with the result consequently that one neither accepts 
firmly nor inclines to one side or the other of a given contradiction until further 
evidence or some other motivating factor intervenes. 
Without an equally explicit explanation of what enters into and constitutes 
each of the various states of mind distinguished by Aquinas, Llull is admittedly 
in agreement with the Angelic Doctor especially on the question of the distinc-
tion between faith on the one hand and rationally established knowledge on the 
other.-7 He accordingly defines faith explicitly as a virtue that involves intimate-
ly both one's intellect and will. 2 8 Concerning rationally established knowledge, 
Llull acknowledges that we are capable of learning many truths, and that with 
certainty on the basis of experience and by means of immediate understanding, 
as well as through reasoning in many cases by way of intellectually necessita-
ting premises or previously known truths, and of necessary reasons. 2 9 At the 
same time, however, and in the absence of sufficiently certifying experience or 
of necessary truths, necessitating premises or reasons, a condition of doubt 1" 
may be and is in order if we are to advance from a state of ignorance to that of 
some understanding and solid knowledge, or at the very least to reasonably well 
founded opinions. 
It is not out of order to remind ourselves at this point that what has been 
explained of Aquinas' and of LlulTs understanding of faith in the previous para-
graphs applies, analogously at least, to both human and divine faith." The so-
cailed problem of faith and reason has to do obviously, however, with divine 
faith, as noted at the beginning of this communication. Whereas in human faith 
we have to do with the acceptance of proposed truths —yes with our intellect 
moved by the affection of our will, but always on the basis of and in reliance on 
: 6 St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 14, a. 1, Vol. 22, p. 436; Summa iheol., II-IIae, q. 2, a. 1, Vol. 8, p. 26. 
" How else may we explain even the titles of writings such as Disputatio fidei et iniellectus in MOG 
IV, viii, 1-26 (479-504), and Liber de convenientia fidei et intellecltts in objecto in MOG IV, xi,l-5 (571-5). 
:" Llull. Declaratio Raymundi in ROL XVII, p. 282. 
:" «...quando ratio est actualiter in homine, sicut est in homine qui per veras signifieationes et 
demonstrationes necessarias habet cognitionem...» Liber coniemplationis in Deum, c. 239, v. 7, MOG X, 
p. 45. 
V l Doubt or dubitatio is listed as the first species of the first rule utrum (or of possibility) in the last 
(more definitive) version of Llulfs Art. See Llull, Ramon, Ars generalis ultima p. 4, c. 1, in ROL XIV, 
p. 26. Discussing the same rule (designated B or possibility) in his Brevis Praclica Tabttlae Generalis, 
Llull wrote; «et sic transit de dubitatione ad scientiam, et quiescit a labore, in quo erat, dum dubitabat.» 
MOG V, iii, 8 (308). 
" Cf. Catechism of tlte Catholic Church, nn. 1813-14, p. 446. Also see Owens, Joseph, Cognilion, 
an Epistemological Inqttiry, (Houston: Center forThomistic Studies, 1992), pp. 282-3. 
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the trustworthiness and authority of a human person— in the case of divine 
faith God enters into the picture as the source of the truth in our minds, with a 
more efficatious influence from Him on our will. 3 2 It is on that account that we 
speak of it as a theological virtue, in the way Aquinas and other well instructed 
Christians identify it. For although it inheres in our intellect as in its immediate 
subject" and although it entails a positive influence from our will, ' 4 divine faith 
is a virtue infused within our intellects and wills by God who gratuitously and 
efficaciously inclines us through it to accept firmly all divinely revealed truths." 
Llull is likewise on his part rather explicit with his explanation that faith is a 
virtue given to our intellect by God 3 6 so as to enable us to believe truths about 
Him which, with out intellect alone, we are not able either to accept or to fully 
understand." Accordingly, therefore, not only does Llull regularly list faith as 
the first of a number of the more basic created virtues and as one of the primary 
principles of his universal art —in both its earliest and later more definitive 
forms— but he defines it clearly too as a God-given virtue, a virtue that enables 
us to believe extra naturam™ truths which our intellect cannot by itself alone 
understand and know." It is consequently God alone who, with and in His 
grace, bestows it4" on all those whom He wills ultimately saved, without of 
course in the least suggesting thereby that our nature is not endowed with an 
intellect or reason by means of which we are able to Iearn about many truths 
without the supernatural assistance and light given us with and in the theologi-
cal virtue of faith. 
Many of the works of both Aquinas and Llull provide ample evidence that 
both thinkers were correctly convinced of the possession by man of a spiritual 
cogni t ive power commonly known as the intel lect or human reason. For 
Aquinas, as suggested earlier, these last two designalions name one and the samc 
intellectual cognitive power within man, a power which functions however 
" St. Thomas, Summa iheol., II-IIae. q. 6, a. 1. Vol. 8, p. 6 1 . 
" Ibid., q. 4, a. 2, Vol. 8, p. 43. 
" Loc. cit. 
" Ibid., Il-IIae. q. 6. a. 1, Vol. 8, p. 61 . 
" «Fides est virtus ... est habitus a Deo datus», Ars generalis ultima,p. 9, ROL XIV, p. 277. «Fides 
vero est lumen a Deo datum», Disputalio fidei et intellectus, prol., MOG IV, viii, 7 (479). 
" «Fides est virtus a Deo data, ut per ipsam credamus id, quod per intellectum non possumus intelli-
gere», Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem, def. princ. fig. V. MOG I, i, 46 (478). See also Ars gene-
ralis uitima, p. 9, c. 9. ROL XIV, pp. 279-80. 
™ «Fides est lumen a Deo datum. cum quo intellectus attingit extra suam naturam intelligendi, cre-
dendo de Deo, quod hoc sit verum, quod non attingit intelligendo». Disp. fidei, pro!.. MOG IV, viii, I 
(479). 
" «Ad credendum vera de Deo, quae homo non intelligit per necessarias rationes», Declaralio 
Raymundi, c. 16, ROL XVII, p. 282. 
"' «Quia Deus esl tantum ille. qui dat lumen fidei hominibus», Liher mirandarum Demonstrationum, 
bk. l . c . I . M O G I I . i v , 2 (178) . 
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in two distinct ways in our discovery of the truth, and thus provides the basis 
for the usage of the two names. If the knowing power permits us to grasp and 
know a given truth directly or immediately as it were, because of the self-evi-
dence of what is known in a judgment, then we may speak of it as intellect or 
the power of understanding. If on the other hand it permits us to learn about a 
truth mediately or on the basis of evidence received from other previously 
known truths, with Aquinas then we may more precisely call it the power of 
reasoning or simply the human reason. 4 ' Somewhat differently, by «intellect» 
Llull frequently understood man's rational power to know and understand inte-
lligible entities and truths now or at the present t ime, 4 : in contradistinction to — 
but yet with clear and definite links with— our intellectual memory and ratio-
nal will. Indeed in some early reflections on «the tree of faith and science» in 
his encyclopedic Liber contemplationis in Denm Llull seems to equate reason 
with those three intellectual powers which are of the very essence of the human 
soul in its rational character. 4 ' It is certainly the possession of reason, Llulls tells 
us there, that establishes man as the noblest of God's creatures in the whole of 
His visible creation. 4 4 Consequently though by divine faith our intellect is ena-
bled to accept with certainty truths which it cannot adequately understand by its 
own natural power, it is in virtue of an influence from that same faith on our 
memory and will that our intellect joyfully and lovingly begins to know and 
even to understand, at least to some extent, the divinely revealed truths, even 
then however still accepted however in virtue of that divine faith. 4 5 
On the preceding pages we stated that, in Christian language «faith» names a 
divinely infused virtue, one which enables us to accept revealed truths with or in 
acts that proceed from our intellect and will. According to Aquinas certainly, 
acts of faith are acts wherein persons, with their intellect moved by their will 
under an impulse of God's grace and light, firmly accept at least implicitly all 
truths that have in some way been divinely revealed. 4 ' ' In virtue therefore, of 
God's gratuitous gift of faith also moving our will, our intellect is thereby also 
moved to accept revealed truths with a divinely supported assurance, despite the 
: l Sl. Thomas, Summa ihcol., I. q. 79, a. 8. Vol. 5, p. 274. 
' 2 Llull, Lih. cont,, c. 239. n. 8, MOG X. p. 10. Compare St. Thomas, Summci tkeol. I, q. 79, a. 1 ad 
I. Vol. 5, p. 258. 
" «Si ratio non esset in tribus virtutibus animae potentialiter ... Undc cum ratio sit actualiter intra 
animam infantuli parvuli...» Lib. coni., c. 239, nn. 5-6, MOG X, p. 45. 
" «Nam ista ratio actualis (Domine) est in homine melior res quae in eo sit crcata: quia pcr ipsam cst 
homo rationalis et nobilitatus super alias creaturas earentes ratione...» /bicl.. n. 9, MOG X, p. 45. 
" «Fides est ipsa virtus ... quae hilariter facit voluntatem hominis amarc veritates Dei. quas intellec-
tus ipsius credit», Dechtrciiio Rcixmundi. c. 16, ROL XVII, p. 282. 
* St. Thmas. Summa theol, ll-llae. q. 2. a. I, Vol. 8, pp. 26-7. 
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insufficiency or lack of objective intellectual evidence, immediate or mediate, 
which may bear on the truths in question. Acts of believing on the strength of or 
in virtue of infused faith, in other words, entail firm assent with a certainty 
grounded in God's trustworthiness rather than in sufficiently necessitating inte-
llectual evidence derived from the object or the truth in question, one of the 
requisites obviously of rational understanding and of science according to 
Aquinas. 4 7 A not different way of thinking is at least implicit in LlulFs unders-
tanding of faith for, according to him, acts of faith or of believing divine truths 
require and call for the cooperative influence of the will on the intellect under 
God's grace. 4 8 Thus he asserts clearly that in faith we actually believe what is 
true with our intellect, but in order to do so we definitely need God's light and 
grace. 4 9 It is only thus that a person is able to accept joyfully, with both his inte-
llect and will acting. truths which the intellect by itself alone cannot understand 
on the strength of necessary reasons. 
A third element that enters into the proper understanding of «faith» —so 
much so that often it is what is in our minds when we utilize the word— is what 
Aquinas designates the «object.»'" Without entering into its distinction as either 
material or formal, let us simply say that the object is as it were, the content of 
the faith, that about which divine faith is all about and is what is expressed in 
the truths believed by it. And as Aquinas declares it. that object is none other 
than the First Truth/ ' God Himself, communicated within the revealed truths 
which ought to be received and believed precisely because they have been reve-
aled. Other truths about other things, which in fact have also been revealed by 
reason of their intimate bonds with God and of our relations with Him, are on 
that account likewise linked to the object of the faith. Contained within and 
constituting the object of faith, these truths requirc also to be accepted as part 
of the actual content of the faith. ? : Again though Llull does not in his writings 
explicitly raise and answer this question in the methodical manner in which 
Aquinas investigated it, there is no doubt that the virtue of faith with which Llull 
was frequently concerned has to do with the truths about God and about other 
items linked to God, simply because God has revealed them. In most cases they 
are truths that surpass our capacity to know about them and to understand 
«* St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 14. a. 1. ad 5, vol. 22. p. 438. 
4 1 «Et ideo fides est una communis conceptio virtuosa et verus habitus. in quo intellectus habet pas-
sionem et voluntas actionenr, secundum quod dicit quidam sapicns. quod intellectus et voluntas aequali-
latem habent per fidem...» Declaratio Raymundi, c. 16, ROL XVII, p. 282. 
4" «...iuvante tamen gratia Dei», loc. cit. 
s" St. Thomas. Summa theol.. I-Iiae. q. 62. a. 2. (1981). vol. 6. p. 402. 
1 1 St. Thomas. De veritate. q. 14. a. 8. Vol. 22. p. 459-60. 
, ; Ibid., q. 14. a. 8. Vol. 22, pp. 259-60; Summa theoi, Il-Ilae. q. 2. aa. 3-4. Vol. 8. pp. 428-30. 
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them naturally by means of necessary reasons." Faith is accordingly like a light 
given to us by God in order that with our intellect, assisted by our will, we may 
accept truths which that intellect is incapable of seizing cognitionally on its 
own strength. Through faith God strengthens and enlarges our intellect, as it 
were, so that thus strengthened we may with that intellect gaze upon the infinite 
God as its object now, in at least in some small measure. Only with the assistan-
ce of divine faith is man's intellect able, in this life already, to rise to some 
understanding of the First Intelligible with some degree of accuracy, but super 
snam naturam^ 
We have a l r eady c a l l e d a t t e n t i o n to the b a s i c a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n 
Aquinas and Llull on the essentials of the problem of reason and faith. We 
have insinuated that when it comes to ques t ions that touch on God both 
thinkers are equally opposed to the two extremes of a) an unthinking blind 
fideism and b) a radical rat ionalism which leaves no room for faith. Their 
opposi t ion followed as a mat ter of course from their explicit acceptance of 
a) truths capable of a natural discovery by human reason on the one hand, 
and b) of truths of faith which required revelation on the other hand, if man 
was to learn about them, and perhaps even to unders tand to some degree 
adequately. With their acceptance of the two orders of t ruths went a constant 
refusal to confuse one with the other, without for all that keeping them at an 
irrational distance, and even less altogether apart, on account of an implicit 
supposed incompat ib i l i ty or as a result of ei ther indifference or outr ight 
hostility to one or the other order of truths. Rather on the contrary, recogni-
zing the intrinsic harmony of all t ruths by reason of their ult imate single 
source, each of the two thinkers was able to see clearly that natural and divi-
nely revealed truths can be brought together within a reciprocally advanta-
geous rational synthesis, a synthesis superior to any purely natural wisdom. 
That synthesis, higher than a sound argumentat ive but purely philosophical 
theology, we find of course in the sacred science of theology of which the 
truths of faith are its main pr imary source. 
Agreement on essentials does not rule out reasonable differences on what is 
not essential. Such differences can be detected between Aquinas and Llull, with-
out for all that thereby diminishing or compromising the basically orthodox cha-
racter of their thought on the specific problem under consideration. Here two 
related points deserve to be mentioned, two points which an occasional critic of 
" «Fides est ipsa virlus, quae cogit ad credendum vera de Deo, quae homo non intelligit per necessa-
rias rationes ... Et talis Fides est ita intellectui et voluntati neeessaria. ut ipse intellectus et voluntas ipsas 
vcritates Dei eontemplari possinl», Declaratio Raymundi, e. 16, ROL XVII, p. 282. 
M «Intellectus enim plus potest ascendere ad primum inlelligibile, videlicet Deum ... Fides est habi-
tus a Deo datus ... nam super suam naturam est.» Ars generalis ttltima, p. 9, c. 9. ROL XIV, pp. 276-1. 
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Llull may be tempted to interpret as indicative of outright opposition. The points 
have to do with answers to these two questions: a) is it possible for us rationally 
to prove or to demonstrate divinely revealed truths, specifically those which 
man's unassisted reason cannot itself ever discover on its own because they are 
supra or extra naturam? b) is it possible for one and the same person to possess 
a given truth, at one and the same time, both on faith and on the basis of well 
established rational knowledge? 
At first sight without any doubt the two questions seem to have been answe-
red by Aquinas and Llull in rather opposite ways. One may incline for that rea-
son to the view of a few critics who look upon Llull —the slightly later of the 
two thinkers by only a few years— as directly contradicting Aquinas. If one 
remembers at the same time that logically contradictory positions cannot both 
be true, one may likewise naturally incline to look upon one or the other thinker 
as mistaken on one or on both questions. Attentive attention however, to what 
both thinkers actually declared in their main writ ings may require that one 
correct, or at least modify, his earlier impression. Aquinas is indeed emphatic in 
his denial that through their reasoning power men are able to establish conclusi-
vely and in a positive fashion revealed truths which were and are beyond the 
competence of human reason to discover and understand adequately. The dis-
tinctive teachings of the most blessed Trinity and other truths that make up the 
Apostles' Creed are what Aquinas had in mind mainly. Explicitly he declares 
them «altogether beyond the competence of human reason.» 5 5 They are truths 
accordingly, which cannot «be proven conclusively by a strict demonstration.» 5 ' ' 
Attempts to do so cannot but be futile, and indeed are bound rather to occasion 
instead ridicule amongst non-believers." Regarding such truths it is the case, he 
tells us, of simpliciter fides apud omnes. In a more precise or stricter language, 
Aquinas would have us speak of them as «articles of faith»' 8 for the reason that 
they are simply supra rationem?' Human reason, as already noted, cannot esta-
blish them rationally and positively on the basis of conclusive demonstrations. 
The Angelic Doctor did not thereby rule out negative proofs which one may 
construct in order to defend them against the attacks of unbelievers who may 
declare them irrational. Other arguments, mainly of analogy, are equally possi-
ble in order to gain a sympathetic hearing by persons who do not accept those 
M St. Thomas, Summa conlra, c. 3, Vol. 23, p. 7; De veritale, q. 14, a. 9. vol. 22. p. 463; Summa 
lheol., Il-IIae, q. 1, a. 8, and q. 2. aa. 7-8, Vol. 8, pp. 21 , 33-5. 
1 4 St. Thomas, Summa contra. c. 9. Vol. 13, p. 22; Suinma theol. Il-IIae, q. 1, a. 5, ad 2, Vol. 8, p. 17. 
5 7 St. Thomas, Summa theol., II-IIae, q. 1, a. 5, ad 1, Vol. 8, p. 17; Summa contra, c. 9, Vol. 13, p. 22. 
" St. Thomas, Summalheol., 11-IIae, q. 1, aa. 6, 8, Vol. 8, pp. 18, 21 ; I. q. 2, ad 1, Vol. 4, p 30. 
" Ibid., II-IIae, q. 1, a. 6, Vol. 8. p. 18. 
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truths because they have not yet been given and received the totally gratuitous 
gift of faith."" Contrariwise however, Aquinas concedes that conclusive rational 
demonstrations are indeed possible regarding the truths which are not «imper-
vious to reason.»"' Properly however, these truths are not articles of faith. They 
should accordingly be seen and designated rather as «preambles» or praesuppo-
sita of it,"2 according to Aquinas. 
Now, how different is L l u l f s thought on that quest ion of the rat ional 
demonstrability of the truths of faith, including especially those which necessita-
ted their being revealed in order for human persons to learn about them initially 
and to accept them on faith? Well, it is the case that more than occasionally — 
and indeed in many writings 6 3 which date from different periods of his life— 
Llull asserted in rather explicit terms that the essential teachings or articles of 
the Christian Faith are provable and demonstrable on the basis of necessary rea-
sons, that strict proofs and demonstrations can well be offered for them in other 
words. without for that denying the possibility, and indeed the necessity, of 
accepting them on faith. In his writings Llull repeatedly refers to the articies that 
we confess in the Apostles' Creed as basic and essential within the Christian 
Faith. Many times he lists as chief amongst them the existence of God, the doc-
trine of the Trinity, the Incarnation of the Word, the world's creation with a 
beginning in time. and man's final bodily resurrection at the end of time. In the 
prologue of an interesting and early Liber de gentili et tribus sapientibus —a 
work divided into four books— Llull informs the reader of his intention first to 
offer for the benefit of a non-believing gentile, demonstrations of God's existen-
ce and of man's future resurrection on the basis of necessary reasons."4 After so 
doing in the first book, he then in the second and fourth books introduces the 
reader to two Iearned wisemen, a Jew and a Moslem. who in turn endeavor to 
outline more or less challenging proofs to establish the superiority of the dis-
tinctive teachings of their respective faiths or laws over the Christian Faith and 
its teachings." 5 And in the third book of the work the reader becomes acquainted 
with a highly learned Christian who in turn outlines a number of concise pro-
ofs , a t t e m p t i n g wi th t h e m to e s t a b l i s h r a t i o n a l l y each of the b a s i c 
'" St. Thomas. Summa contra., c. 9. Vol. 13. p. 22. 
"' Loc. cit.; Summa theol., Il-Ilae. q. 2. a. 10. Vol. X . p. 39. 
St. Thomas. Summa theol., I. q. 2. a. 2, ud I (19881. Vol 4. p. 39; II-llae. q. 2. a. 10. Vol. 8, p. 39. 
For example Liber de genlili et tribus sapientibus, Liber mirandarum demonstrationum, and Liber 
de articulis fidei Sacrosanctae et Salutiferae Legis Christianae sive Liher apostrophe. All three may be 
read in MOC II. i and iv.12-1 14 (177-420); and IV. ix. 1-26 (505-30). An earlier but longer Liherde quu-
tuordecim articulis Sacrosanctae Romanae Calholicae Fidei muy be read in MOG II. v. I -190 (421-610). 
" ; Bk. I , M O G I I , i, 6-21 (26-41). 
H Bks. 2. 4. MOG II, i, 21-41, 73-89 (41-61. 93-109). 
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articles of the Christian Faith contained in the Creed,"" without of course den-
ying that they are still the main articles of the Christian Faith. 
In a slightly later work, but still one of LlulTs early writing with the interest-
ing title of Liber mirandarum demonstrationum, the author starts by ftrst declar-
ing his intention still to continue his efforts to persuade non-Christians of man's 
capacity to understand, on the basis of necessary reasons, the truth of the most 
distinctive Christian beliefs regarding the Trinity and the Incarnation, on the 
condition however that one does not initially at the outset totally reject them. A 
person who does not accordingly reject their truth outright may and will, with a 
sort of an incipient faith as it were, begin to have some understanding of them 
and to grasp the reasons that with the encouragement of that quasi-incipient faith 
can be given for them."7 Right after stating that intention in the prologue, in the 
fifty chapters of each of four books into which the Liber mirandarum is divided 
Llull sketches as many concise proofs —each supported by necessary reasons— 
in order to demonstrate by means of them, but always with the aid of God's 
grace, that human reason has the capability or power of: a) proving God's exis-
tence, b) of proving the presence within God of a Trinity of Persons with equally 
necessary reasons, and c) of proving also Chrisf s Incarnation, likewise with 
necessary reasons, as well as His future return at the end of the world.'* 
About fifteen years later in 1298, Llull wrote a Declaratio Raimundi per 
modum dialogi in which with arguments he attacked each of 219 theses upheld 
at the University of Paris by a number of vocal radical Aristotelians during the 
last three or four decades of the thirteenth century and into the fourteenth cen-
tury. These 219 theses had been censured by the then bishop of Paris in 1277, as 
the complete title of the Declaratio recalls. In its prologue Llull directs the 
attcntion of his opponents to an earlier writing in which he had with success 
endeavored, he tells us, with rational arguments to prove the truth of the Trinity. 
of the Incarnation, of the wotld's non-eternal creation and of man's final resu-
rrection."" Still in a similar vein fourteen years later in 1312. only four years 
prior to his octogenarian death and in a booklet titled De novo modo demon-
strandi. Llull again repeated his conviction regarding man's capacity to prove 
rationally, though within limits, the articles of the Christian Faith, once they 
have been previously received on or with faith. It is however impossible to suc-
ceed in such a task if one relies simply, or even primarily, on what our sensory 
and imaginative powers tell us, because of the simple reason that the articles of 
* Bk. 3, MOG II. i. 41-73 (61-93). 
1 Prol.. MOG II. iv. I (177). 
" B k s . 1-4, MOG11, iv, 2-18. 19-84.85-164. 165-244(178-95. 195-260. 261-340. 341-4201. 
"" Dedaralio Rainuonli. prol.. ROL XVII. p. 255. 
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the Christian Faith lie outside the compass of those powers. The task can be 
accomplished only by an understanding supported by faith, and by effectively 
utilizing the objectively necessitating rationes divinae understood in their hig-
hest or superlat ive condit ion. 7 " Similarly in the prologue of an Excusatio 
Raimundi Llull again explicitly called attention to his immediate intention of 
writing another short treatise in which he would simply establish rationally that 
the truth is that there is only one God who is at the same time a Trinity of 
Persons. 7 ' 
lt is accordingly and clearly undeniable that Llull often spoke or wrote of 
demonstrating and of proving, on the basis of necessary premises and reasons, 
the principal truths taught as the Christian Faith. As were for Aquinas those 
truths are of two distinct orders or types: a) some, such as the truth of God's 
existence, did not have to be revealed absolutely, in order for human beings to 
know about and to accept them. For that reason Saint Paul alluded to them in 
his epistle to the Romans. Indeed it is a fact that rational proofs have been offe-
red for at least some of them by philosophers and non-philosophers without the 
benefit of the teachings of religions which accept divine revelation. We have 
seen that Aquinas would have us speak of these truths as «preambles» rather 
than «articles» of the Christian Faith. 7 : b) Other truths of the Christian Faith 
however, we have already seen, stood in need of a supernatural disclosure or 
revelation in order for human beings to learn about them and accept them ini-
tially, for the simple reason that they are supra rationem.13 
LlulTs apparent opposition to Aquinas' explicit rejection of any conclusive 
positive demonstrations for the teachings or articles of the Christian Faith is 
greatly diminished, and may even seem to disappear, if note is taken of the fact 
that oflen when Llull wrote of «proofs» and «dcmonstrations», even by way of 
«necessary reasons», he did so in a less rigorous meaning than Aquinas had in 
mind. 7 4 A similar assertion may be made when comparing other equally outstand-
ing thinkers, as for example Aquinas again and John Duns Scotus. 7 ' The latter, it 
is well known, differed somewhat from, indeed may have been more deman-
ding than, Aquinas on the question of the conditions and other requirements of a 
111 De novo mondo demonstrandi, prol.. ROL XVI, p. 348. 
" Prol. ROL XI. p. 340. 
" St. Thomas. Sunima iheol.. I. q. 2, a. 2, ad 2. Vol. 4, p. 30; 11-IIae, q. 2, a. 10, ad 2, vol. 8. p.39. 
" St. Thomas, Summa theol., Il-IIae, q. 2, a. 3, Vol. 8, p. 28. Llull, Disputatio fidei et inlelleclus, 
prol., MOG IV. viii, 1 (479); Declaralio Ruimundi, c. 16, ROL XVII, pp. 282-3; Ars generalis ullima, p. 
9, c. 9. ROLXIV, pp. 275-6. 
7 4 As evidence read the prologue of Liher mirandarum demonstralionum already cited. 
" How else can we explain John Duns Scotus' dissatisfaction with Aquinas' First Way or proof for 
God's existence and a number of divine attributes, a situation which lcd Scotus to develop his own dis-
tinct proof of God's existence. 
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strict demonstration regarding important philosophical problems, inclusive spe-
cifically of the existence of God. It is therefore well to keep this in mind unless 
one wishes to ignore or disregard completely the context and the tenor of the 
specific writings in which Llull made use of the word «demonstration» and of 
other words related or similar to it. A possible explanation of LlulTs less rigo-
rous usage of «demonstration» may be given if we remember that in the Catalan 
language —the philosopher's native tongue, one in which he wrote a sizeable 
number of his books ,— as well as in other romance languages , the word 
«demonstracio» or its equivalent in those other languages does not carry in ordi-
nary usage the meaning of a strict demonstrative proof in an Aristotelian sense." 
Certainly if, with just a little attention. one inspects a few of the proofs which 
Llull outlined in support of the main articles of the Christian Faith in many 
books, one will readily note that they do not exhibit the rigor of a quasi-mathe-
matical proof in a neat syllogistic form. 7 1 Some of the proofs which he proposcd 
may even perhaps rather be considered arguments by analogy, or even simply 
strong persuasive arguments that cumulatively however, cannot but exhibit a 
much greater persuasive force. In one of his own writings Llull even expressed 
himself thus «ista probatio, sive dicatur demonstratio, sive persuasio, vel quo-
cumque alio modo, hoc non curo; quia ... nihil mutatur in re.» 7 s LluITs main con-
cern was to make the point that readers and listeners of what he had to say ought 
to, or at least could be led to, accept the truth of the main Christian teachings not 
simply on or with faith —a gift which God alone can bestow on man, he unders-
tood and tells us ,— but also with at least a minimum of understanding and of 
knowledge supported by intellectually necessitating reasons. objectively suffi-
cient to make the truth manifest to open and receptive thinking persons. 7" 
A more telling explanation for the apparent disagreement between LIull and 
Aquinas on the question of whether revealed truths —specifically those requir-
ing revelation to enable man to learn about them initially,— can be rationally or 
scientifically established, without thereby rendering faith practically null or 
unnecessary. is perhaps more than intimated by the second question still to bc 
looked at shortly. The more telling reason is suggested by a third type of 
demonstration, seemingly unknown to eatiier thinkers but accepted and utilized 
by Llull in the solution of many questions. It is neither found nor alluded to in 
the writings of the Angelic Doctor. But although Llull did not in every instance 
"" Undcr the tille of Libre Je demonstracions the Catalan text may be read in ORL XV. 
" In eonfirmation examine many of the proofs offered in the fifty short chapters of each of the four 
books of the Liber mirandarum demonslratioiuim, as well as many of those offered in the four books of 
the Liber de gentili ei tribus sapientibus also already cited. 
" Llull, I.iberde coitvenientia fidei el intellectus in objeclo. p. I, MOC IV. xi. 4 (572). 
" Llull, Libermirandarum. bk. 1, e. \.MOG II. iv. 2 (178). 
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identify or explain them always in the same terms, in some of his later writings 
he distinguished three types of demonstrations. He named them propter quid, 
quia and per aequiparantiam,"" and he cautioned the reader at the same time that 
of the three the third type, to wit the per aequiparantiam type of demonstrations, 
was unknown to the ancients and supposedly to many of his immediate prede-
cessors. 8 1 He then adds however. that when questions bear on the reality of God 
in a significant way then neither of the two types of proofs available to the 
ancients is of much effective use. We cannot appeal, he explains, to causes or to 
anvthing else which may be prior to God by nature or in some other way, as 
called for in propter quid demonstrations, since He is totally uncaused and there 
is nothing else that precedes Him in any way. Neither is it possible to have 
recourse to finite effects —and all created entities are that way— as required in 
the case of quia demonstrations, in order to learn with some adequacy about the 
entitative interior and inner activity within the infinite transcendent First Being.*2 
It is therefore the case that neither of the two types of demonstrations «known to 
the ancients» is capable of being used in order to demonstrate the truth of the 
revealed articles of faith, in the language suggested by Aquinas. 8 1 
The situation is different however, when one takes into account the third type 
of demonstration which Llull identified as «per aequiparantiam.» 8 ' 1 Through 
recourse to it he himself endeavored again and again to prove rationally the chief 
doctrines or articles of the Christian Faith, without for all that disregarding or in 
the least setting aside what he had earlier and sincerely accepted by faith. 8 5 Nor 
did he thereby claim to be able now to comprehend fully, or even much of, the 
mysterious interior reality of the Godhead. 8 6 If attempts at rationally investiga-
ting questions concerning God are to prove successful however, there is one 
essential condition or prerequisite that must be satisfied. That condition is 
simply that the inquirer be previously rationally satisfied —this a consequence, it 
is true of an initial incipient trust or reliance, somewhat akin to some sort of 
faith at least implicitly— that God's infinite perfections exist together in a per-
fect or absolute equality and reciprocal identity with each other and with the 
K See Liber de demonstratione per aequiparantiam prol., ROL IX, p. 216; Liber ntirandarttm, bk, 2. 
c. 13, MOG II. iv, 35 (211); tntroductorium Artis demonstrativae, c. 3, MOG III, i, 4 (58); Ars demons-
traliva, prol.. MOG III, ii. 1 (93); Liber de qtiinqite sapientibits. prol., MOG II, iii, 4 (128). 
Introductorium Artis demonstrativae, c. 3, MOG III, i, 4 (58); Liber de quinque sapientibus, prol., 
,WfX; i I . i i i . 4 ( I28 ) . 
*J Liber de quinque sapientibus, prol., MOG II, iii, 4 (128). 
™ Loc. cit; De novo modo tlemonsirandi, prol., ROL XVI, p. 348. 
** Loc. cii. 
" Libertle convenientia. c. 1, MOG IV, xi, 4 (572). 
" Dispitliitio fidei, p. I, MOG IV, viii, 3 (481). 
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divine essence and being. 8 7 It is on the basis of that infinite reciprocal presence 
and identity —something which follows from God's simplicity and infinity of 
being,— that it is possible then, by means of per aequiparanliam demonstra-
tions of which Llull made use, to establish in a rational manner truths which 
God chose to reveal and of which man could learn about initially only by way 
of a supernatural intervention and revelation, as taught by the Christian Faith. 8 8 
It may be said that, according to LIulTs understanding, per aequiparantiam 
demonstrations, with the necessary reasons supporting them, are objectively 
sufficient to establish rationally the essential truth of the basic teachings or arti-
cles of the Christian Faith. Our subjective acceptance of them however, is not an 
exclusively intellectual affair. No person therefore, is unconditionally compelled 
to acquiesce in their truth intellectually because there always remains a certain 
degree of freedom regarding them on our part. Though basically intellectual, 
the acceptance of those truths also calls for some action on the side of man's 
will. At least there must be a readiness or sincere willingness to accept the truth 
regardless of its initial source."'' Only then may a person be said to be ready, 
with both his intellect and will, to receive it not only in faith (should the latter 
be given by God), but also to understand it with a sufficient degree of adequacy 
on the basis of reasons which support it sufficiently, even in matters of divine 
faith. Unless therefore a person believes first —at least in the sense that he or 
she has a willingness to accept the truth, provided it is properly presented to 
him or her, so that he or she is ready to accept the gift of faith, should it please 
God to bestow it— that person cannot grasp and understand the necessary rea-
sons which, according to Llull, demonstrate in a rational manner the truths of 
faith. Those persons therefore, who in a very real sense willfully reject even the 
possibility of the truth inherent in the teachings of faith, cannot but fail intellec-
tually to grasp any demonstrations brought forward to prove those teachings and 
truths. 9 0 
Llu l f s admittedly less rigorous understanding of demonstrat ion and his 
acceptance and usage of a third type of demonstrations absent from Aquinas' 
writings dictate that we do not view his thought regarding demonstrations of 
revealed truths as in direct opposition to the stated position of Aquinas. That 
understanding and acceptance go a long way also towards explaining Llulfs 
contention, again at first sight seemingly at odds with Aquinas, that a given 
truth can be held by one and the same person simultaneously on faith and as 
consequence of rationally established knowledge or science. To this item of the 
s" Liberde articulisfidei, prol., MOG IV, viii, 24 (502). 
** Loc. cil. 
'" Libermirandarum, bk. 4, prol., MOG II. iv. 166 (342). 
*' Loc. cil. 
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rejection of such a possibility by Aquinas and of its contrary affirmation and 
acceptance by Llull we now direct our attention. 
More than once and that both in his Quaestio disputata de veritate" and in 
his Summa theologiae*- the Angelic doctor concisely and forcefully asserts that 
it is impossible for a given truth to be held by a person at the same time on faith 
and by way of scientific knowledge." 1 As if to explain his seemingly uncompro-
mising stand he asserts that faith and science are not just simply distinct postu-
res, for they are rather mutually exclusive, whenever of course they concern the 
same object and truth. That they be found together in the same person is impos-
sible, Aquinas contends, because faith is about the unseen, understood as what 
is not evident either to our senses or to our intellect directly or indirectly. Man's 
naturally acquired knowledge (including the scientific type) is about objects and 
truths that are themselves evident or seen directly —then it is a matter of 
understanding or intellectus, Aquinas asserts— or, as in the case of reasoned 
scientific knowledge, indirectly through principles or truths previously known 
and understood." 4 Scientific knowledge is therefore through or by way of reaso-
ning which is very distinct from and other than direct understanding. 
With a different frame of mind clearly, not long after Aquinas' death, in his 
own writings Llull took a different. not to say opposite. view to what was 
expressed by Aquinas when he insisted that «de eodem not sit fides et scientia» 9 5 
(within of course the same person at one and the same time). There is no great 
difficulty in showing that Llull was neither explicitly nor directly attacking the 
Angelic Doctor with his own seemingly paradoxical stand, provided one takes 
note of the fact, as suggested earlier, that Llull had other adversaries in mind at 
the time when he stated his own position. We indicated then that chief amongst 
those adversaries was a seemingly vocal group of radical Aristotelians, today 
often known as Latin Averroists, whom Llull met and confronted at Paris during 
the closing decades of the thirteenth century and at the start of the fourteenth 
century. At about the same time Llull needed also to challenge the implicit 
fideism of certain contemporary and seemingly timid Christians and theologians 
unable, even perhaps unwilling, to bolster and defend the main tenets of the 
Christian Faith with rationally convincing arguments.'"' One gathers from a num-
" Q . 14. a. 9, Vol. 22, p. 463. 
v : II-IIae. q. I. a. 5. Vol. 8, p. 16. 
" St. Thopnas. Summa theol., Q-IIae, q. I. a. 5. ad 2. Vol. 8, p. 17; De veritate, Q. 14. aa. 1,9. Vol. 
22, pp. 437. 463. 
'" St. Thomas, Summa theol.. Il-IIae. q. I. a. 5, Vol. 8. p. 13: De veritate, q, 14, a. 1. Vol. 22. pp. 
436-7. 
" St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 14, a. 9, Vol. 22, p. 463; Summa theoL, Il-Ilae. q. I. a. 5, Vol. 8, p. 13. 
''" Fermando Dominguez's introduction to Ramon LlulTs Principia Philosophiae in ROL IX. pp. 15-
16. 
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ber of writings which Llull finished during those years that both the mentioned 
radical Aristotelians and the slightly fideistic theologians openly and not infre-
quently asserted, obviously for different reasons, that the Christian Faith was 
practically unintelligible, not to say totally irrational.97 By so declaring, they 
made it extremely difficult, and at times well-nigh impossible, to lead thought-
ful educated non-Christian believers sympathetically to look into the truth and 
reasonableness of the main Christian teachings. 9 8 
Though admittedly therefore not in direct opposition to the stated position of 
Aquinas on the issue, Llull's repeated assertions of the possibly simultaneous 
presence of both faith and scientific understanding regarding a given truth with-
in one and the same person cannot but appear at first sight in sharp contrast to it. 
Still one may legitimately ask how much of a difference, if not of direct opposi-
tion, there actually obtains between the two thinkers on that particular issue. In 
one of his earliest reflections on the relation between faith and reason. contained 
in his encyclopedic Liber contemplationis in Dettm, Llull expressed the basi-
cally same thought of Aquinas on the mutual exclusiveness of faith and reason, 
when both are about the same truth within one person and at the same time. In 
those early reflections he there first distinguished three distinct modes or ways 
in which faith may be found present in a particular person: actually, potentially 
and in a habitual or intermediate manner. Llull there wrote these words: «haec 
fides actualis (Domine,) non potest in uno tempore capi simul cum ratione in 
anima hominis, et hoc est quia ipsa quando est actualis implet totam memorian 
et intellectum et voluntatem ipsius animae...» 9 9 Had Aquinas made exactly the 
same explicit distinction in his writings, perhaps one could then say that both 
thinkers were of exactly the same mind, the more so if it could be established 
that each was thinking specifically of the theological virtue of faith of which 
Christians speak. This has to be noted because, when he wrote the just mentio-
ned words, Llull may have been thinking also of any other type of genuine reli-
gious faith. He clearly did so at other times when he wrote of the Jewish faith or 
even that of other non-Christian believers." 1 0 
More to the point without a doubt is a difficulty which easily comes up in 
connection with Aquinas ' categorical «de eodem non sit fides et scientia.»"" 
From what we have seen, it can be affirmed with assurance that both Aquinas 
and Llull viewed the authentic faith of the Christian as a basic theological vir-
'" Supplicatio sacrae theologiae professoribus ac baccalareis studii parisiensis, prol.. MOG IV. x, I 
(563). 
• Disputatio fidei. p. 1, MOG IV, viii. 2 (480). 
" C . 238. n. 12, MOG X. 42. 
'"" See titles of books 2. 4 in Liber de gentili. MOG II. i. 21-73 (41-93). 
"" De veritate, q. 14, a. 9, Vol. 22, p. 463; Sttmma theol., II-IIae, q. 6. Vol. 8. p. 16. 
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tue, one that accordingly has God as its proper object, as well as its efficient ori-
gin or cause." 1 2 Though he perhaps seems not to have utilized the term «theolo-
gical» to identify the faith of the Christian, Llull certainly viewed that faith as 
God-g iven and as an infused vi r tue ."" He expl ic i t ly d i s t inguished it and 
contrasted it with science or demonstrative rational knowledge, the latter an 
obviously natural human intellectual virtue in the language of philosophy." 1 4 At 
the same time therefore, that they declared science an acquired natural virtue, 
both Aquinas and Llull —each in his own words— asserted the supernatural 
character of the infused virtue of faith, a virtue which enables our intellect, and 
ourselves with it, to learn about first and then to accept truths which would 
otherwise escape our knowledge, for the simple reason that they exceed the 
natural power and ways of the human intellect. 1 0 5 In their own distinct words 
they both wrote accordingly of the diversity of faith and science, and they clear-
ly viewed both of them as very distinct types or species of virtues: 1 0 6 science as 
a definitely natural acquired virtue, and faith on the other hand as a supernatural 
virtue bestowed on men by God in a totally gratuitous manner. 1 0 7 
Granted the distinction in type or in species of virtues between science and 
faith, it is easy to see that no outright opposition obtains between the two of 
them. Consequently it is more than conceivable that they can be present toget-
her within one person, even when they are about one and the same truth at the 
same time. Very possibly it is so in reality since obviously one and the same 
truth has been grasped or received differently, one may say, first with the eyes 
and acceptance of a supernaturally given faith, and secondly thereafter with the 
eyes and assent of our naturally possessed intellect."1 8 In the explained position 
of Aquinas however, it is far from clear how a natural virtue can set aside and 
substitute, as it were, for an admittedly superior supernatural virtue which. 
Llull, Ars generalis ullima, p. 9, c. 9, ROL XIV. pp. 275-6: Disputatiofidei, prol., MOG IV. viii. 1 
(479); Liber mirandarum, bk. I . c . I, MOG II, iv, 2 (178). 
"" Declaratio Raimundi, c. 16. ROL XVII, 282; Disputatiofidei, prol.. MOG IV, viii. 43 (419). 
"" «Ipsum autem per habitum fidei credimus, et per habitum sapientiae intelligimus. Et non sequitur 
contradictio, per hoc quia habitus fidei et sapientiae non sunt idem specie nec numero.» Ars Mystica, d. 
3. p. 3, ROL V, p. 344. Ars generalis ullima, p. 9, c. 9, ROL XIV, p. 276. 
"" St. Thomas, Summa theol.. I-IIae. q. 62, aa. 1-2 (1901). Vol. 6. pp. 401-2. Llull. Disputatio fidei. 
prol.. MOG IV. viii. 1 (479); Declaratio Raimundi, c. 16, ROL XVII. p. 282. 
"*' St. Thomas. Summa theol., I-IIae, q. 62, a. 2, Vol. 6. p. 403. Llull. Dispulalio jidei. prol., MOG 
IV. viii. I (479); Arsgeneralis ultima, p. 9. c. 9, ROL XIV. pp. 276-7. 279. 
"" Llull. Ars generalis ultima, p. 9. c. 9. ROL XIV, p. 276; Disputatio fidei. prol., MOG IV. viii. 1 
(479). 
"" Llull, Ars generalis ullima. p. 9, c. 9, ROl. XIV, p. 276. For the correctness of his thought Llull 
could loday appeal to the declaration of the First Vatican Council on the natural knowableness of God's 
existence, as well as to the slatement in the new Catechism oflhe Catholic Church which declares thal «I 
believe in God» is the firsl and most fundamental affirmation of the Crced. 
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given its higher God-given efficacy, enables us to accept supernaturally revea-
led truths. There is evidence in their respective writings that both Aquinas and 
Llull were aware of this difficulty. Llull stayed clear of it and had no need to 
address it because of his conviction that the virtue of faith and the merit which 
attaches to it remain, indeed will very likely increase, even after some rational 
understanding has come about or taken place about as a result of necessary rea-
sons, provided it has followed, it has been noted, the prior or at least implicit 
acceptance of the revealed truths of faith.1"" Differently on the other hand, 
Aquinas appears to have made a conscious effort to avoid the difficulty with an 
assertion that the merit which normally attaches to faith is not set aside, even 
though faith has been replaced by scientific knowledge. That because of the 
supposed believer's continued willingness to accept a truth in faith, should it 
occur that, for whatever reason, demonstration ceases to be effective or fully 
operative in the case of truths now presumably scientifically known."" 
The simultaneous acceptance of a revealed truth a) on account of the theolo-
gical virtue of faith and b) because of understanding as a result of demonstrative 
reasoning is possible, according to LlulFs explanations, for the simple reason 
that, as long as divine faith is present in an authentic mode, understanding of the 
same truth can come about or follow, inspired and assisted of course by the pre-
ceding and still accompanying faith in that truth. 1" In addition everything will 
occur in such a way however, that the higher understanding of the truth rises 
due to appropriate necessitating reasons, the stronger and higher faith becomes 
and rises at the same time. An analogy to what happens may be seen in the way 
oil rises higher above the level of water in a container, the more water is added 
to that already in the container." : Add to this, that merit must not be deemed the 
main component of faith, although Llull would argue for practically the same 
reason that merit is neither set aside nor diminished when new or additional 
understanding blossoms under the inspiration of faith." 3 
One more item may well be noted in order to gauge more accurately the 
extent of the difference (and of a possible opposition) implied in some of LlulTs 
ideas on this last question as against the thought expressed by Aquinas. This 
added item is nothing less than a seeming inconsistency detected within some 
statements of Aquinas with a bearing directly on the question. Only pages after 
"" Ars generalis ultima. p. 9, c. 9. ROL XIV, p. 276: Disputatio fidei. prol . MOG IV. viii. 2-3 (480-1). 
"" St. Thomas. Summa theol. Il-IIae.. q. 2, a. 10. a<J 2. Vol. 8. p. 39. 
11 LIulI, Ars generalis ultima, p. 9. c. 9. ROL XIV. p. 278. 
1 , 3 «Sicut oleum in vase. in quo est supra aquam: et qui aclderet plus de aqua in praedicto vase, aqua 
quidem ascenderet ad illum locum, in quo eral oleum; et deinde oleum ascenderet in alliorem gradum. in 
quo non erat.» Ars generalis ultima, p. 9, c. 9. ROL XIV, p. 276. 
lbid..pp. 278-9. 
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his explicit rejection in his Quaestio disputata de veritate to the effect that it is 
not possible that «de eodem sit fides et scientia»" J simultaneously within one 
person, Aquinas went on to explain and defend this: that there are at least two 
truths which must needs be held by all human beings (who supposedly have rea-
ched the age of reason) with an explicit faith in order to be on the way to their 
eternal salvation. The truths are a) that God is possessed of real existence, and 
b) that He exercises a providence that extends to all human affairs." 5 Elsewhere 
in the very same Question'"' however, as well as somewhat early in the Summa 
theologiae,"1 Aquinas had insisted with confident assurance that the truth of 
God's existence confessed at the beginning of the Creed, is not properly an arti-
cle of faith. Rather it is a preamble or a praesuppositum of it." 8 As such it is sus-
ceptible of a strict demonstration by sound human reasoning. God's existence, 
in other words, is a demonstrable truth and capable therefore of being received 
by us with solid scientific knowledge."" But yet on the other hand in the passage 
from the De veritate just alluded to Aquinas has instructed readers that the truth 
of God's existence is one of two truths that have to be held on faith in order to 
achieve salvation and eternal bliss. Now, if a truth, namely that of the existence 
of God, can be the object of a strict positive demonstration and can therefore be 
known scientifically, but if at the same time with Aquinas one deciares that it is 
a truth that must be held with an explicit faith in order to insure salvation, 
obviously then it follows that at least in the case of that truth it is possible for 
someone to hold it at the same time both on faith and on the basis of scientific 
knowledge. I say «at least», because there are at least other truths, namely 
God's providence, the unicity or oneness of God, etc. about which similar points 
can be made on the basis of what Aquinas says about them in his writings. In 
those places of his writings wherein he discusses the number of the articles 
explicitly enumerated in the Creed the Angelic Doctor acknowledges that, as its 
first article declares, we believe, i.e. accept in faith, that only one God Exists. 1 2" 
Clearly he there wrote of the oneness of God as being the first article of the 
Christian Faith, a truth consequently which presumably can only be known by 
us with certainty because it has been supernaturally revealed. Moreover since it 
is «an article», indeed the first article of the Creed, again presumably it cannot 
be known with scientific certainty simply on the basis of conclusive human reaso-
" O. 14, a. 9, Vol. 22, p. 463. 
'" De veritate, q. 14. a. 11. Vol. 22, p. 470. 
"' Ibid., q. 14, a. 9, Vol. 22, p. 463. 
1 1 7 1 ,q . 2, a. 2, ad I, Vol .4 , p. 30. 
"" De veritate. q. 14, a. 10, ad 8, Vol. 22, p. 464. 
""Loc. cil. Also Smwna tlieol.. I, q. 2, aa. 2-3, (1888), Vol. 4, pp. 30-2. 
m Siimma theol., 11-IIae, q. I. a. 8, Vol. 8, p. 21. 
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ning. But again on more than one occasion elsewhere in his writings Aquinas 
more than implied that the oneness or unicity of God can be demonstratively 
established, and indeed he undertook to do so . i : i Moreover his proofs or Ways 
for God's existence, like those of other classical theists, aim to conclude by phi-
losophical reasoning to the existence of only one supreme First being or God. 
From what has been brought out on the preceding pages of Aquinas' and of 
LlulTs understanding of the problem of the relations of faith and reason, we 
may arrive at the conclusion that the positions of the two medieval thinkers are 
not as antithetical or as far apart as it may appear at first sight and as some cri-
tics seem to suggest. More important: the conclusion seems indeed inescapable 
that on that basic question of the distinction and relation between religious faith 
and rational understanding the thought of Ramon Llull, and not only that of 
Thomas Aquinas , is both reasonable and in basic harmony with orthodox 
Christian thought. That is the way it had to be according to LlulFs sincerest 
intentions. A careful Christian thinker that he was, he always intended, more 
than anything else, to persuade readers and others of the fact that a solid philo-
sophical understanding of the truth cannot but be in accord with the higher 
truths taught as the Christian Faith. ' : : For that reason, and as it is well borne out 
by his numerous writings, he is indeed a true model and example of authentic 
Christian philosophers. 
Walter W. Artus. 
St. John ' s Univers i ty 
J a m a i c a , N e w York 
RESUM 
The differences between Aquinas and Llull on questions of faith and reason are 
perhaps not as great as has sometimes been stated. Both agreed that there are truths 
the intellect cannot comprehend and both agreed on their basic definition of faith. 
Both were opposed to blind fideism and to radical rationalism, and accepted a divi-
sion between truths capable of being discovered by reason and those which required 
revelation, that is to say, between science and faith. They differed, however, on two 
questions: a) on the possibility of rationally proving divine truth, and b) on that of 
the same person at the same time possessing a truth both on the strength of faith and 
reason. As to the first, both admitted proofs by analogy or of congruence. but to 
, ; | Summa theoi, I, q. I I , a. 3, Vol. 4, p. 111: De veriiate. q. 14, a. 9, Vol. 22, p. 463. 
Llull, Liber mirandarum. prol. MOG II, iv, 1 (177); also bk. 3. prol. MOG II. iv, 85 (261); 
Supplicatio sacrae, prol.. MOG IV, x, I (563). 
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these Llull added his demonstratio per aequiparantiam. As to the second, even 
Aquinas accepted the preambula fidei as being revealed truths accessible to reason, 
whereas Llull used the metaphor of understanding being like oil floating on the 
water of faith, in which the greater the faith the higher the understanding. Their two 
positions, therefore. although different, are not antithetical. 
